Revolution or no revolution? - No revolution

As you have probably understood, the Asia Times Online is one of my favorite publications. It was even before they first published me last week too.

Two contributors for ATOL share their views on the possibility of a revolution in China.

Samuel Bleicher tells you why there could very well be one:

Just as we failed to predict and prepare for the implosion of the Japanese economy and the collapse of the Soviet Union, we appear unready for a dramatic economic and political reversal in China that would be a defining event of the 21st century. [...]

A crisis might be triggered by any number of factors. A dramatic slowdown in the Chinese or world economy could disrupt the lives of millions of factory workers. Serious rationing of water, food or energy, whether by dramatic price increases or some other mechanism, could be unacceptably painful for a large part of the population. The loss of individual savings from a stock market or banking collapse could fuel popular discontent among the new urban elite. Even with continuing economic progress, widening income disparities could generate increasingly serious opposition in rural areas. A widespread farmers' strike might cut off food to the urban centers, leaving them in a state of chaos.

Systemic crisis could then lead to an open challenge to the regime. Here are two scenarios to consider. In one, students, factory workers and peasants gather again in Tiananmen Square to protest against economic conditions and perceived political non-responsiveness. When urban professionals start to join them, the central government calls in the army. It begins a brutal campaign of violently repressing demonstrators, arresting domestic and foreign media representatives, and purging uncooperative members of the party and civilian government, entirely disregarding the legal system. The demonstrations do not stop, and various groups ask for outside help to protect foreign residents and foreign investment and to end the wholesale disregard of human rights. Overseas Chinese and major US banks and corporations with investments and supply lines at stake argue that the situation is too dangerous to ignore.

In the second scenario, the central government's inability to control the economy or cure the country's problems becomes increasingly obvious. The educated, urbanized residents of Shanghai and the urbanized areas around Hong Kong increase control over their regional governing systems, perhaps through more democratized party elections, and disregard Beijing's directives. Taiwan offers economic and technical assistance to these areas, with the aim of creating more of a "one China, many systems" environment.

In response, the Chinese military threatens to impose military rule on Shanghai and Hong Kong, and to recapture Taiwan. The new local leaders ask for help from Taiwan and other nations to avoid the bloodbath, economic disruption, danger to US and other foreign citizens, and destruction of foreign investment property that will inevitably result if no one comes to their aid.

Responding to Chinese instability

Some American hardliners may believe that the US should encourage crisis and regime collapse in China. However, nothing in Chinese history, or in the history of revolutions and coups almost anywhere, gives any reason to believe that a collapse or violent change in Chinese leadership would be followed by a more stable, more reliable, more democratic or more cooperative international actor than the current central government.

Francesco Sisci explains why that's very unlikely:

There is a very widespread perception that street protests are just the first step in a continuum that leads inexorably to riots and ultimately revolution. But this is misleading, because there is a huge qualitative difference between protests and revolution. Revolution requires more than just an urge to change things; it needs a direction, where to lead the change. And it is precisely here - the direction of change - where there is the most confusion, both within China and without. [...]

But the overall impression is that Chinese are fed up with revolutions, having had more than their fair share in the past 160 years. This is especially so given the highly visible improvements in daily life, social differences notwithstanding. No matter what is happening in relative terms, in absolute terms life is getting better. Only 15 years ago, school canteens in central Beijing provided a protein-poor diet. This is no longer true. In addition, there is more social mobility now than there has been for centuries; more possibilities to send children to university or to start up a commercial venture. Lastly, there is no longer anything resembling the clear-cut "struggle line" of Marxist cliches: the poor are not against the rich; the proletariat is not the leading class of society; factory workers are actually opposed to peasants migrating to cities; and intellectuals all want to either get an official post or go into business.

In modernizing, urbanizing, marketizing China, if often feels as though everybody is against everybody - hardly a situation ripe for revolution, but definitely one where the central government is constantly asked to mediate among different constituencies: the rich against the poor, the middle class against everyone else, the center against the provinces, the districts against the provincial authorities. All these perpetual conflicts require central government intervention more, not less, than a decade or two ago. In those days, all was clear: the party leaders had everything, and the rest of the population was out in the cold. The leaders felt isolated, and thus, at times, besieged. The social divide was very clear: those who lacked power - students, workers, farmers - could all potentially unite against those with power - the officials. [...]

Historically, all major shocks to the power of the Party came not from some alien opposition, but from within the party itself. [...] The only possibility for a major political upheaval comes from a serious power struggle within the party that breaks out in the open, which was what happened in the Tiananmen incident or, to a certain degree, with the repression of the Falun Gong.

It seems to me that the latter is more convincing. But were a revolution to occur, I think Bleicher is right on about how little we would be prepared for it.

Photo credits: AP Photo / Greg Baker.